Active Intermediation in Overlapping Generations Economies with Production and Unsecured Debt by Pingle, Mark & Tesfatsion, Leigh
Economics Publications Economics
1998
Active Intermediation in Overlapping Generations
Economies with Production and Unsecured Debt
Mark Pingle
University of Nevada
Leigh Tesfatsion
Iowa State University, tesfatsi@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, Growth and Development Commons,
and the Other Economics Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/439. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
              
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2, 1998, 183–212. Printed in the United States of America.
ACTIVE INTERMEDIATION IN
OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
ECONOMIES WITH PRODUCTION
AND UNSECURED DEBT
MARK PINGLE
University of Nevada
LEIGH TESFATSION
Iowa State University
It is well known that the first welfare theorem can fail for overlapping generations
economies with private production and unsecured debt. This paper demonstrates that
the reason for this failure is that intermediation is modeled as a purely passive
coordination activity implemented by a Walrasian Auctioneer. When intermediation is
modeled instead as a contestable activity carried out by a corporate intermediary
owned by consumer-shareholders and operated in their interest, every equilibrium
is Pareto efficient. In broader terms, these findings caution that the inefficiency
observed in standard modelings of overlapping generations economies may not be the
reflection of an intrinsic market failure. Rather, the observed inefficiency could instead
be due to a fundamental incompleteness in the model specification—the presumed
inability of private agents to exploit the earnings opportunities associated with
incurring and forever rolling over debt.
Keywords: Intermediation, Overlapping Generations, Pareto Efficiency, Production,
Unsecured Debt, Bubbles
1. INTRODUCTION
Tirole (1985) studies an overlapping generations economy in which agents can
issue consumption loans, as in Samuelson (1958), and also can engage in private
goods production as in Diamond (1965, pp. 1130–1135). In particular, the savings
of each generation can be used in part to finance the consumption by agents
whose consumption demands are in excess of their endowments and in part to
finance the capital investment of firms. Tirole shows that the resulting economy
fails to satisfy the first welfare theorem. Specifically, as reviewed in Section 2,
below, two stationary competitive equilibria exist for this economy: a Pareto-
inefficient equilibrium with no consumption loans, and a Pareto-efficient “golden
rule” equilibrium in which consumption loans are made.
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This paper suggests that the failure of the Tirole economy to satisfy the first
welfare theorem can be attributed to the passive role assigned to intermediation.1
The only intermediary in the Tirole economy is an implicitly present Walrasian
Auctioneer concerned with coordination but not with optimization. As detailed in
Section 3, below, private agents in the Tirole economy do not exploit viable and
profitable debt-issue opportunities.
To explore this point further, the Tirole economy is generalized in Section 4
to include the explicit presence of a corporate intermediary owned by consumer-
shareholders.2 The efficiency properties exhibited by the resulting brokered econ-
omy then depend on the exact modeling of the intermediary’s objective. One
possibility is that the brokered-economy intermediary behaves as a Walrasian
Auctioneer, i.e., as a price-setting agent concerned only with trade and credit
coordination. In Section 5.1, it is shown that the brokered economy reduces to the
Tirole economy in this case.
Another possibility, however, is that the intermediary moves beyond mere co-
ordination and acts in the interests of its shareholders. In Section 5.2, we retain
the assumption that the intermediary is a price setter, but we also assume that the
intermediation market is contestable. That is, we assume that entry occurs when
an entrant can feasibly assume the liabilities of the existing corporate intermediary
and can strictly increase the dividends paid to its current shareholders. We assume
that the existing corporate intermediary sets its stock share prices so as to prevent
the entry of any competitors, and we extend the standard definition of an equilib-
rium to include this corporate intermediary objective. Under these assumptions,
we show that every brokered-economy equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
The crucial fact used to establish this brokered-economy first welfare theorem
is that entry into the intermediation market is infeasible only if a certain price con-
dition holds. This price condition is analogous to the well-known Cass–Balasko–
Shell transversality condition shown by Balasko and Shell (1980) to be necessary
for Pareto efficiency in the context of a pure-exchange overlapping generations
economy. Our findings thus suggest an economic interpretation for this transver-
sality condition as a constraint on the price-setting behavior of an optimizing
corporate intermediary in a contestable intermediation market.
Overall, our findings indicate that the Pareto inefficiency exhibited by commonly
used models of dynamic open-ended economies with finite-lived agents can, to a
large extent, be accounted for by the fact that intermediation is modeled as a purely
passive coordination activity. As demonstrated here for the Tirole economy, this
inefficiency may be ameliorated or even eliminated if intermediation is more real-
istically modeled as an activity oriented toward the exploitation of available profit
opportunities.
2. TIROLE ECONOMY
2.1. Basic Model Structure
As depicted in Figure 1, the model of an economy developed by Tirole (1985)—
hereafter referred to as the Tirole economy—is an overlapping generations
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FIGURE 1. Tirole economy.
economy in which each consumer lives for just two periods: youth and old age.
The generation of consumers born at the beginning of period t consists of Lt con-
sumers and is referred to as generation t . Population grows at the rate n‚ 0, so
that LtC1D [1Cn]Lt . The economy begins in period 1 with L0> 0 old consumers
of generation 0 and L1D [1C n]L0 young consumers of generation 1.
The Tirole economy has a single physical resource that may be either consumed
or used in production as capital. Adopting the conventional time dating of goods,
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the resource during period t is referred to as good t . Each young consumer in
each generation t ‚ 1 inelastically supplies one unit of labor in return for a real
(resource) wage wt . Wage income is used by young consumers to provide young-
age consumption c1t and savings st . Old-age consumption c2tC1 is provided entirely
from savings and accumulated interest; old consumers do not work.
Consumer saving is held in two possible forms: units of capital, and units of a
bubble asset that pays no dividends.3 The bubble asset can be thought of as vouchers
representing real purchasing power—for example, as real money balances, or as
a credit or debit held on account with an intermediary. If capital and the bubble
asset are both to be held in competitive equilibrium, the bubble asset must bear the
same yield as capital. Thus, it is assumed that saving in either form has a common
rate of return rtC1 over each period t ‚ 1.
Consumers have identical preferences. The objective of each generation-t young
consumer is to maximize his lifetime utility U .c1t ; c2tC1/, where U .¢/ has the usual
curvature properties.4 Given any wt > 0 and rtC1> ¡1, the problem faced by this
young consumer takes the form
max U
¡
c1t ; c
2
tC1
¢ (1)
with respect to (st ; c1t ; c2tC1) subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
c1t D wt ¡ st I
c2tC1 D [1C rtC1]st I
c1t ‚ 0; c2tC1 ‚ 0:
Let the solution to this problem be denoted by
x.wt ; rtC1/ D
¡
s.wt ; rtC1/; c1.wt ; rtC1/; c2.wt ; rtC1/
¢
: (2)
Each old consumer in the initial period 1 receives a payment [1 C r1]s0 of
principal plus interest, where the savings level s0 satisfies s0D s.w0; r1/ and the
savings function s.¢/ coincides with the savings function determined for each
generation t ‚ 1 agent in (2). The consumption by each old consumer in period 1
is therefore c21 D [1C r1]s.w0; r1/.
Output in the Tirole economy is produced at the beginning of each period by
a firm that uses capital and labor inputs in accordance with the production rela-
tion Y D F.K ; L/. The production function F.¢/ is assumed to exhibit constant
returns to scale, and to satisfy the usual continuity and curvature restrictions.5
Letting k · K=L and y · Y=L denote the capital/labor ratio and the output/labor
ratio, respectively, the production relation can be expressed in per-capita (i.e.,
per-worker) form as yD F.k; 1/ · f .k/.
In each period t ‚ 1 the firm must pay the wage ratewt to each unit of employed
labor as well as a rental rate for each unit of employed capital. The rental rate on
capital in period t is assumed to be the same as the interest rate rt on savings.
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The price-taking firm selects levels of capital and labor inputs to maximize profits.
Formally, the firm’s problem may be stated as
max
K‚0;L‚0
[F.K ; L/¡ rt K ¡ wt L] : (3)
For a positive pair .Kt ; Lt / of capital and labor inputs to solve problem (3), it is
both necessary and sufficient that the capital/labor ratio kt · Kt=Lt satisfy
rt D f 0.kt /I (4)
wt D f .kt /¡ f 0.kt /kt : (5)
Conditions (4) and (5) generate the well-known factor-price frontier relationship
between the wage rate wt and the interest rate rt . For any given interest rate
rt > 0, let k.rt / denote the capital/labor ratio kt that uniquely satisfies condition
(4). Substituting k.rt / into condition (5), the wage ratewt that satisfies condition (5)
then is uniquely determined as a strictly decreasing function w.rt / of the interest
rate rt .
In each period t ‚ 1 the supply of capital consists of aggregate savings St¡1 ·
Lt¡1st¡1 less that part of savings held in the form of the bubble asset. Let Bt¡1 ·
Lt¡1bt¡1 denote aggregate bubble asset holdings and Kt denote the firm’s aggregate
demand for capital. Then, in per-capita terms, supply equals demand6 in the capital
market when
[st¡1 ¡ bt¡1]=[1C n] D kt : (6)
As in Tirole (1985, p. 1503), the following restriction is imposed on the growth of
the aggregate bubble asset holdings Bt :
Bt D [1C rt ]Bt¡1; (7)
or, in per-capita terms,
bt D [.1C rt /=.1C n/]bt¡1: (8)
The implications of restriction (7) are examined in Section 3.
Young consumers in each period t ‚ 1 supply labor inelastically, in total amount
Lt . Supply equals demand in the labor market when the firm chooses to employ
this labor supply. As in Tirole (1985), it is assumed that supply equals demand in
the labor market in each period t , so that Lt denotes the period-t workforce as well
as the period-t population of young consumers.
Because capital in the Tirole economy does not depreciate, the total supply of
product available in each period t is YtCKt . The total demand for product includes
capital demand for the following period, KtC1, and aggregate consumption for the
current period, Lt c1t C Lt¡1c2t . In per-capita terms, supply equals demand in the
product market for period t when
yt C kt D [1C n]ktC1 C c1t C c2t
–[1C n]: (9)
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Finally, following Tirole (1985), the economy is initialized by assuming that the
capital/labor ratio k0> 0 and the per-capita bubble asset holdings b0‚ 0 are exoge-
nously given. The capital/labor ratio k0 in turn determines the initial interest rate r0
and the initial wage ratew0 in accordance with the marginal productivity conditions
r0 D f 0.k0/I (10)
w0 D f .k0/¡ f 0.k0/k0: (11)
The Tirole economy then can be reduced to a pair of difference equations in the
state variables kt and bt over times t ‚ 1,
[1C n]kt D s. f .kt¡1/¡ f 0.kt¡1/kt¡1; f 0.kt //¡ bt¡1I (12)
bt D .[1C f 0.kt /]=[1C n]/bt¡1; (13)
starting from the exogenously determined initial values k0 and b0.
2.2. Competitive Equilibrium and Efficiency
As in Tirole (1985), a competitive equilibrium is defined for the Tirole economy in
terms of optimality conditions for the consumers and the firm, the capital market-
clearing condition, and the growth restriction on bubble asset holdings, all in
per-capita form.7
DEFINITION 1 (Tirole Equilibrium). Given initial values k0> 0 and b0‚ 0
for capital and bubble asset holdings, a sequence .st ; c1t ; c2t ; kt ; bt ; rt ; wt : t ‚ 1/
of savings levels st , consumption levels c1t and c2t , positive capital/labor ratios kt ,
per-capita bubble asset levels bt , interest rates rt > 0, and wage rates wt > 0 is a
competitive equilibrium e.k0; b0/ for the per-capita Tirole economy if and only if
it satisfies the following four conditions:
(i) Firm optimization. Conditions (4) and (5) hold for each t ‚ 0.
(ii) Consumer optimization. In each period t ‚ 1, the young consumer’s choice vector
xt D .st ; c1t ; c2tC1/ solves the lifetime utility maximization problem (1) conditional
on wt and rtC1, i.e., xt D x.wt ; rtC1/; and each old consumer in period 1 consumes
c21 D [1C r1]s0 with s0D s. f .k0/¡ f 0.k0/k0; r1/.
(iii) Capital market clearing. In each period t ‚ 1, condition (6) holds.
(iv) Bubble asset growth restriction. In each period t ‚ 1, per-capita bubble asset hold-
ings grow in accordance with condition (8).
A competitive equilibrium e.k0; b0/ for the Tirole economy is called stationary
if kt D k0 and bt D b0 for each period t ‚ 1.
Tirole (1985) assumes that there exists a unique r¯ satisfying s.w.r¯/; r¯/D
[1C n]k.r¯/, with 0< r¯ < n. Also, as detailed in Section A.1 of the Appendix, sev-
eral additional technical regularity conditions are imposed on the savings function
s.¢/ and the production function f .¢/. Given these regularity conditions, the Tirole
economy has two distinct stationary competitive equilibria: a Pareto-inefficient
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equilibrium characterized by the interest rate r D r¯ and zero bubble asset holdings,
and a Pareto-efficient golden-rule equilibrium characterized by the interest rate
r D n and positive bubble asset holdings.
Given the stationary interest rate r D r¯ , the optimal consumer and firm choice
variables and the wage rate are stationary and are given by x¯D x.w.r¯/; r¯/, ¯kD k.r¯/,
and w¯Dw.r¯/. It is easily established that the sequence e.¯k; 0/D .x¯; ¯k; 0; r¯ ; w¯ :
t ‚ 1/ satisfies the conditions in Definition 1 characterizing a stationary compet-
itive equilibrium. Hereafter, this bubbleless stationary competitive equilibrium is
abbreviated by e¯.
The allocation achieved under the bubbleless stationary equilibrium e¯ is not
Pareto efficient. Because r¯ < n, a suitably small reduction in the equilibrium capi-
tal/labor ratio ¯k in any given period t 0, offset by a corresponding increase in bubble
asset holdings, permits an increased stationary level of net output y¡ nk in all pe-
riods t ‚ t 0. This in turn implies that young- and old-age per-capita consumptions
also can be increased in all periods t ‚ t 0; see condition (9).
Given the stationary interest rate r D n, the optimal consumer and firm choice
variables and the wage rate take on the stationary values xn D x.w.n/; n/, kn D
k.n/, and wn Dw.n/. Bubble asset holdings then are given by bn D s.w.n/; n/¡
[1C n]k.n/. Although the sign of bn is not explicitly determined by Tirole (1985),
it can be shown that bn is positive.8 It then is verified easily that the sequence
en.kn; bn/D .xn; kn; bn; n; wn : t ‚ 1/ satisfies all conditions in Definition 1 char-
acterizing a stationary competitive equilibrium. The allocation generated under
e.kn; bn/ is the Pareto-efficient allocation yielding maximum net output y¡ nk in
each period t ‚ 1. Hereafter, the equilibrium en.kn; bn/ is abbreviated as en .
Tirole (1985, Prop. 1, p. 1504, and Prop. 2, p. 1507) provides a complete charac-
terization of the stability and efficiency properties of the Tirole economy under the
assumption that r¯ < n. Specifically, given any initial capital/labor ratio k0> 0, he
shows that there exists a maximum feasible value b.k0/ for the initial bubble asset
holdings b0 such that the following two results are true. First, given the initial con-
ditions .k0; b.k0//, there exists a unique competitive equilibrium e.k0; b.k0//; this
equilibrium is Pareto efficient, and it converges to the Pareto-efficient golden-rule
stationary equilibrium en . Second, given the initial conditions .k0; b0/ for any b0
satisfying 0• b0< b.k0/, there exists a unique competitive equilibrium e.k0; b0/;
this equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, and it converges to the Pareto-inefficient
bubbleless stationary equilibrium e¯. These properties are schematically depicted
in Figure 2, a modified version of Figure 1 in Tirole (1985, p. 1505).
In general, of course, Pareto inefficiency of a stationary equilibrium does not nec-
essarily imply that any equilibrium converging to this stationary equilibrium must
itself be Pareto inefficient. Consider, for example, the Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans
one-sector neoclassical optimal growth model with a positive social discount rate
and an infinite time horizon as depicted by Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Fig. 2.2,
p. 46). To each positive initial capital/labor ratio there corresponds a unique opti-
mal (hence Pareto-efficient) growth path; but this optimal growth path converges
to a stationary equilibrium that is strictly Pareto-dominated by the golden-rule
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FIGURE 2. Phase diagram for Tirole economy.
stationary equilibrium. For the Tirole economy, however, each equilibrium e.k0; b0/
with 0• b0< b.k0/ is Pareto inefficient because it is characterized by capital over-
accumulation in every period. A suitably small increase in the bubble asset holdings
bt¡1 offset by a decrease in the capital/labor ratio kt in any period t permits an
increase in the period-t net output yt ¡ nktC1 and hence also in the per-capita
consumptions for the young and old consumers in all periods t 0 ‚ t .
3. PASSIVE MEDIATION IN TIROLE ECONOMY
The Tirole economy does not include an explicit intermediating institution. Nev-
ertheless, it is still possible to consider production and intermediation as distinct
functions. Production is the transformation of capital and labor inputs into output.
Intermediation matches agents who have demands with suppliers who can meet
these demands. Here, attention is focused on the intermediation of demands and
supplies for savings, and the term “intermediary” is used as a shorthand for the
implicit agency that mediates savings activities in the Tirole economy.
The Tirole economy differs from the economy modeled by Diamond (1965) in
one crucial respect: The market-clearing condition for capital is relaxed to allow
for consumption loans, i.e., intergenerational transfers of goods that permit some
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agents to consume more than their current endowments. Specifically, as depicted
in Figure 1, the Diamond market-clearing condition St D KtC1 is replaced by the
condition St D Bt C KtC1. From the viewpoint of period-t young consumers, Bt
represents the portion of their savings held in the form of a bubble asset. From
the viewpoint of the intermediary, Bt represents the portion of the intermediary’s
deposits not invested in capital. The intermediary is thus potentially able to use Bt
to enhance the consumption of generation t ¡ 1 old consumers.
More precisely, the incoming receipts of the Tirole intermediary in period t con-
sist of the savings deposits St received from young consumers and the repayment
[1C rt ]Kt of principal plus interest received from the firm for capital borrowed in
period t ¡ 1. On the other hand, the intermediary is obliged to pay [1C rt ]St¡1 of
principal plus interest to generation t ¡ 1 old consumers and to provide the firm’s
demand for capital, KtC1. The net receipts received by the intermediary in period t
therefore are given by
5t D St C [1C rt ]Kt ¡ [1C rt ]St¡1 ¡ KtC1
D [St ¡ KtC1]¡ [1C rt ][St¡1 ¡ Kt ]
D Bt ¡ [1C rt ]Bt¡1: (14)
Comparing (14) with the restriction (7) imposed by Tirole on the growth of the
bubble asset holdings Bt , the latter restriction appears in a new light. Specifically,
the Tirole restriction (7) forces the intermediary’s net receipts (14) to be zero in
each period t ‚ 1. In imposing condition (7), Tirole (1985, p. 1503) correctly notes
that physical capital and the bubble asset must earn the same yield in order for
both assets to be held in equilibrium. The equality of these yields, however, does
not imply that restriction (7) must hold. Rather, restriction (7) holds if and only if
an additional special-case restriction is invoked: Namely, the bubble asset remains
in fixed supply.
To see this, let 2t¡1 denote the quantity of the bubble asset supplied by the
intermediary in period t ¡ 1, and let pµt¡1 denote the price of the bubble asset
during period t ¡ 1 measured in units of good t ¡ 1. Because the bubble asset is
used exclusively to finance consumption loans, it follows that Bt¡1D pµt¡12t¡1.
For the bubble asset to be held at the same time that capital loans are being made, the
bubble asset must earn the same rate of return as capital, meaning that pµt =pµt¡1D
[1C rt ]. Consequently, the following sequence of equalities must hold:
5t D Bt ¡ [1C rt ]Bt¡1
D pµt 2t ¡ [1C rt ]pµt¡12t¡1
D pµt [2t ¡2t¡1] : (15)
As condition (15) makes clear, whether or not the Tirole restriction (7) holds,
and hence whether or not the intermediary has nonzero net receipts, depends upon
whether or not the supply of the bubble asset is fixed.
              
192 MARK PINGLE AND LEIGH TESFATSION
As shown in note 7, the Tirole restriction (7) is equivalent to the restriction
that supply exactly equals demand in the product market. Thus, if restriction (7)
need not hold, product market-clearing in this strong form need not hold either (cf.
note 6). In fact, the intermediary’s ability to achieve positive net receipts depends
upon his ability to generate an excess supply in the product market. When there
is an excess demand in the product market, Bt is strictly less than [1 C rt ]Bt¡1
and the intermediary’s net receipts 5t are negative. This situation cannot arise in
competitive equilibrium because the intermediary is unable to fulfill all contractual
obligations. In contrast, when there is an excess supply in the product market, i.e.,
when Bt is strictly greater than [1 C rt ]Bt¡1, the intermediary’s net receipts are
positive. In this case, the intermediary can meet all contractual obligations and
then keep the remaining excess supply.
In short, once the assumption of a fixed bubble asset supply is relaxed, it is
possible for the intermediary to obtain ownership over a positive quantity of the
economy’s resources by increasing the supply of the bubble asset. With this oppor-
tunity present, is it reasonable to suppose that the coordination of trade and credit
transactions remains the intermediary’s sole objective? If not, the intermediary’s
stance toward accumulating net receipts must be clarified in order for the model
of the economy to be complete.
The next section sets out a generalization of the Tirole economy that explicitly
includes a corporate intermediary with an objective that goes beyond passive co-
ordination. In particular, the intermediary is not required to keep the bubble asset
in fixed supply. The efficiency implications of assuming this more active form of
intermediation are explored in Section 5.
4. BROKERED ECONOMY
Consider an extension of the Tirole economy, hereafter referred to as the bro-
kered economy, in which all savings activities are explicitly mediated by a single
intermediary. Consumers have the opportunity to purchase two assets from the
intermediary: namely, bonds, and shares of stock in the intermediary. There are
no risk differences between bonds and stock shares, so that consumers base their
asset choices only upon expected rate of return.
Each young consumer in generation t ‚ 1 demands ‚dt bonds and µdt shares of
stock, to be sold in the subsequent period. The period-t prices of bonds and stock
shares in terms of good t are p‚t and pµt , t ‚ 1, and are taken as given by consumers.
The intermediary distributes dividends to its consumer-shareholders in accordance
with the following dividend policy: Each share of stock purchased during period
t entitles the owner to a per-share dividend in period t C 1.
Let dtC1 denote the per-share dividend expected by each young consumer in
generation t ‚ 1. The utility maximization problem of this price-taking young
consumer then takes the form
max U
¡
c1t ; c
2
tC1
¢ (16)
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with respect to .c1t ; c2tC1; ‚dt ; µdt / subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
c1t D wt ¡ p‚t ‚dt ¡ pµt µdt I
c2tC1 D p‚tC1‚dt C pµtC1µdt C dtC1µdt I
c1t ‚ 0; c2tC1 ‚ 0:
The utility function appearing in (16) is assumed to be the same as described in
Section 2 for the Tirole economy.
No sign restrictions are placed on ‚dt or µdt , implying that short sales are allowed
for both bonds and stock shares. Consequently, assuming that all prices are positive,
no finite solution exists for problem (16) unless bonds and stock shares yield a
common positive gross rate of return, i.e., unless
p‚tC1
–
p‚t D
£
pµtC1 C dtC1
⁄–
pµt D [1C rtC1] (17)
for some rtC1>¡1.
Given positive prices, together with the viability condition (17), it is straightfor-
ward to show that the utility maximization problem (16) faced by each generation-t
young consumer in the brokered economy can equivalently be expressed in form
(1), i.e., in the same form as the utility maximization problem faced by each
generation-t young consumer in the Tirole economy. Consequently, as for the Ti-
role economy, an optimal solution exists for the consumer’s planned savings level
st · [c1t ¡wt ] and consumption levels (c1t ; c2tC1) as a function of the wage wt and
the common rate of return rtC1. Hereafter, this optimal solution is denoted by9¡
s.wt ; rtC1/; c1.wt ; rtC1/; c2.wt ; rtC1/
¢
: (18)
On the other hand, the individual bond and stock-share demands of each brokered-
economy consumer are indeterminate because the consumer is indifferent among
all bond and stock-share combinations (‚dt ; µdt ) that yield his optimal planned
savings level.
The problem facing the firm in the brokered economy is identical to that facing
the firm in the Tirole economy. In each period t ‚ 1, the profit-maximizing firm
has the opportunity to rent capital from the intermediary to be used as an input
to production along with the labor Lt supplied inelastically by young consumers.
The rental capital K dt that the firm plans to employ during period t is demanded
from the intermediary during period t¡1. As for the Tirole economy, it is assumed
that the interest rate charged to the firm for the rental of this capital is the same
as the interest rate rt on savings. Consequently, the firm plans to make a payment
[1C rt ]K dt of principal plus interest to the intermediary in period t .
The intermediary’s net receipts 5t in period t ‚ 1 are equal to the quantity of
good t remaining in the intermediary’s possession after all of his contractual obliga-
tions are fulfilled, apart from dividend payments. These net receipts are determined
by a consideration of the intermediary’s bond, stock-share, and capital transactions.
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Let3st · Lt‚st and2st · Ltµ st denote the total amounts of bonds and stock shares
that the intermediary plans to supply to consumers in period t , and let K st denote
the amount of rental capital that the intermediary plans to supply to the firm for
use in period t . As a result of bond sales and purchases, the intermediary in period
t plans to receive p‚t 3st units of good from generation-t young consumers and to
deliver p‚t 3st¡1 units of good t to generation-.t ¡ 1/ old consumers. Moreover,
as a result of stock-share sales and purchases, the intermediary in period t plans
to receive pµt 2st units of good from generation-t young consumers and to deliver
pµt 2
s
t¡1 units of good t to generation-(t ¡ 1) old consumers. Finally, as a result of
capital rental transactions, the intermediary in period t plans to receive a principal-
plus-interest payment [1C rt ]K st from the firm and deliver capital K stC1 to the firm
to be employed in the subsequent period t C 1. Consequently, the intermediary’s
planned period-t net receipts take the form
5t D p‚t
£
3st ¡3st¡1
⁄C pµt £2st ¡2st¡1⁄¡£K stC1¡.1Crt /K st ⁄; t ‚ 1: (19)
In the Tirole economy, only one asset—the bubble asset—is used to finance con-
sumption loans. In the brokered economy, there are two assets that the intermediary
could use to finance consumption loans: namely, bonds and stock shares. To achieve
a more direct comparison with the Tirole economy, it is useful to place the follow-
ing financing restriction on the intermediary, which ensures that stock shares in
the brokered economy correspond to units of bubble asset in the Tirole economy:
p‚t¡13
s
t¡1 D K st and pµt¡12st¡1 D Bt¡1; t ‚ 1: (20)
Specifically, restriction (20) guarantees that the intermediary finances his capital
loans K st solely by means of bond transactions and his consumption loans Bt¡1
solely by means of stock-share transactions. Letting bt · Bt=Lt denote per-capita
consumption loans, this financing restriction in per-capita terms reduces to
p‚t¡1‚
s
t¡1 D [1C n]kst and pµt¡1µ st¡1 D bt¡1; t ‚ 1: (21)
Given the viability condition (17) and the financing restriction (20), the inter-
mediary’s period-t net receipts (19) can be expressed as
5t D pµt
£
2st ¡2st¡1
⁄
D Bt ¡
£
pµt
–
pµt¡1
⁄
Bt¡1
D dt2st¡1 C Bt ¡ [1C rt ]Bt¡1: (22)
By assumption, the intermediary uses these net receipts to fulfill his dividend obli-
gations, dt2st , where dt is the period-t per-share dividend expected by generation-
(t ¡ 1) old shareholders.
If the intermediary’s dividend obligations exhaust his net receipts, i.e., if5t D
dt2st¡1, then it follows from (22) that Tirole’s bubble asset growth restriction (7)
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holds for the brokered economy. In particular, (7) holds with net receipts and div-
idend payments both equal to zero if the intermediary issues no new stock shares
in period t . Note, however, that (7) is not an ex ante restriction on intermediary
behavior. For example, as is explored in Section 5.2, it may be that a compet-
ing intermediary is able to successfully enter against an existing intermediary in
some period t by offering a windfall dividend to shareholders in excess of dt ,
which the competing intermediary finances by new stock-share issue. In this case,
5t > dt2st¡1 and Tirole’s restriction (7) fails to hold.
To close the model, we now impose initial conditions. As for the Tirole economy,
it is assumed that initial values k0> 0 and b0‚ 0 for per-capita capital and per-
capita consumption loans are exogenously given, and that the initial interest rate
r0 and wage rate w0 are determined by conditions (10) and (11).
Extending Tirole’s initial conditions to recognize financial assets, it is also as-
sumed that each old consumer in the initial period 1 owns a positive number ‚0 of
bonds and a nonnegative number µ0 of stock shares, where ‚0 and µ0 are exoge-
nously given. Thus, the aggregate quantities of bonds and stock shares in existence
in period 1 are30 · L0‚0 and20 · L0µ0. It is assumed throughout the remainder
of the paper that 3s0 · 30 and 2s0 · 20. Moreover, for reasons clarified below, it
is assumed that µ0D 0 if and only if b0D 0.
The expected income of each old consumer in the initial period 1 is determined
by the sale value of his bond and stock shareholdings as well as by his dividend
payment d1µ0. Thus, each old consumer in period 1 plans to consume
c21 D p‚1‚0 C pµ1µ0 C d1µ0: (23)
This planned consumption is assumed to derive from an unmodeled time-0 choice
problem of form (16).
More precisely, it is assumed that the viability condition (17) holds for t D 0 for
some r1> 0, where the initial prices p‚0 and pµ0 are taken to be any positive values
satisfying the financing restriction (21). In particular, then, p‚0‚0D [1 C n]k.r1/
and pµ0µ0D b0. Consequently, the planned consumption of old agents in period 1
can be expressed equivalently in the form
c21 D [1C r1]s.w0; r1/; (24)
where the savings function s.¢/ coincides with the savings function determined for
each generation t ‚ 1 agent in (18). Moreover, it follows from condition (11) and
from the preceding discussion that this savings function satisfies
s. f .k0/¡ f 0.k0/k0; r1/ D [1C n]k.r1/C b0: (25)
Given the regularity conditions imposed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) on the curvature
of the savings function s.¢/ and the production function f .¢/ and assumed also in the
present paper (see Section 2 and Appendix A), relation (25) uniquely determines
r1> 0 as a function of k0 and b0.
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The brokered economy is not yet complete. An objective for the intermediary
needs to be specified, along with market-clearing conditions. In standard overlap-
ping generations models, these two specifications traditionally have been equated;
the intermediary is assumed to be a passive Walrasian Auctioneer concerned only
with trade and credit coordination. As will now be clarified, changing the specifi-
cation of the intermediary from a passive coordinator to an active agent motivated
by net receipts has immediate and dramatic implications for the efficient operation
of the economy.
5. MODELING THE INTERMEDIARY: EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS
5.1. Intermediary as a Passive Coordinator
Suppose the brokered-economy intermediary passively mediates savings activities
in concert with the Walrasian Auctioneer who passively mediates trades in goods
and services. That is, the intermediary and the Walrasian Auctioneer together set
prices and per-share dividends and then stand ready to mediate trades for bonds,
stock shares, goods, and services and to channel savings into consumption loans
and capital investment. In particular, the intermediary does not engage in new
stock-share issue. Rather, the sole objective of the intermediary is to coordinate
market transactions.
The labor, capital, and product markets for the brokered economy then operate
in the same manner as for the Tirole economy. In particular, labor is supplied
inelastically to the firm by young consumers and the firm is assumed to employ
this labor. Also, in accordance with the financing restriction (20), the intermediary
engages in bond transactions with consumers to supply the capital demanded by
the firm. Finally, the intermediary distributes all net receipts back to consumer-
shareholders as dividends in each period t .
Given the viability condition (17), it follows from (22) that the intermediary’s
per-capita net receipts …t · 5t=Lt in each period t ‚ 1 are given by
…t D pµt
£
µ st ¡ µ st¡1
–
.1C n/⁄
D bt ¡
£
pµt
–
.1C n/pµt¡1
⁄
bt¡1
D dt
£
µ st¡1
–
.1C n/⁄C bt ¡ [.1C rt /=.1C n/]bt¡1: (26)
The stock shares 2st supplied by the intermediary in period t are given by the
stock shares 2st¡1 that generation-(t ¡ 1) old agents sell back to the intermediary
in period t . That is, in per-capita terms,
µ st D µ st¡1
–
.1C n/: (27)
Given relation (27), it follows from (26) that the net receipts of the intermediary
are zero in each period t ‚ 1.
Given zero net receipts in each period t ‚ 1, the intermediary can feasibly make
the per-share dividend payments dt expected by shareholders if and only if these
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expected dividend payments are zero. It then follows from (26) with dt D 0 that
Tirole’s state equation (13) must hold. As previously shown in note 7, this state
equation is equivalent to product market clearing in a strong supply-equal-demand
sense.
Finally, given the viability condition (17), the optimization problems faced by
consumers and the firm in the brokered economy coincide with the optimization
problems faced by consumers and the firm in the Tirole economy once the identifi-
cation st · [c1t ¡wt ] is made for the brokered economy. The specific mix of bonds
and stock shares purchased by each consumer in the brokered economy is deter-
mined by the specific mix of bonds and stock shares supplied to young consumers
by the intermediary in accordance with his capital supply objective, subject to the
restriction that the portfolio purchased by each consumer must be equal in value
to the consumer’s optimally chosen savings level. In particular, for each t ‚ 1,
the intermediary’s stock-share supply bt¡1D pµt¡1µt¡1 must satisfy Tirole’s state
equation (12). The only difference from the Tirole economy is that the instruments
for achieving the consumers’ optimal savings levels are now explicitly identified
as bonds and stock shares.
For later reference, the brokered-economy market-clearing conditions for bonds,
stock shares, capital, and product are listed below in per-capita form10:
p‚t ‚st D p‚t ‚dt ; t ‚ 1I (28)
pµt µ st D pµt µdt ; t ‚ 1I (29)
kst D kdt ; t ‚ 1I (30)
yt C kst D [1C n]kdtC1 C c1t C c2t
–[1C n]; t ‚ 1: (31)
In summary, when the market coordination conditions (27) through (31) are
imposed on the brokered economy, the resulting Walrasian brokered economy is
essentially equivalent to the Tirole economy.11 In particular, every Walrasian bro-
kered economy satisfies the two Tirole state equations (12) and (13), implying that
the same paths are generated for per-capita capital kt and per-capita consumption
loans bt for the brokered economy and the Tirole economy if the same initial values
k0> 0 and b0‚ 0 are given.
One implication of this equivalence is that the Walrasian brokered economy
supports the Pareto-inefficient outcome e¯ as a competitive equilibrium. Another
implication is that the intermediary implicitly present in the Tirole economy is a
peculiarly passive agent who does not seek out opportunities to increase the welfare
of his consumer-shareholders. In particular, as indicated by (26), the intermediary
ignores the possibility that his net receipts—paid out as dividends to his consumer-
shareholders—could potentially be increased by issuing additional shares of stock.
In contrast, real-world intermediaries generally take advantage of the opportunity
to issue additional stock shares up to the point where stock dilution is perceived
as having adverse consequences.
It is now shown that the passive intermediary in period 0 is susceptible to en-
try in period 1 unless b0 happens by chance to be equal to b.k0/ (cf. Figure 2).
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Specifically, if b0< b.k0/, a competitor can feasibly assume the liabilities of the ex-
isting passive intermediary while offering current shareholders a windfall dividend
secured by means of new stock-share issue.
5.2. Potential Entry by Active Intermediaries
Suppose the existing intermediary in period 1 is currently subject to government
regulations that protect his monopoly position against potential entrants. Some
measure of protection against unrestricted entry is certainly necessary, for an en-
tering intermediary with no liabilities can always attract potential shareholders
away from an existing intermediary who has liabilities resulting from the previous
issue of unsecured debt. In addition, suppose the existing intermediary is subject to
a no-profit regulation and hence is currently playing a purely passive coordination
role as described in Section 5.1.
Suddenly, government in period 1 decides to open the intermediation market
to permit entry in any period t ‚ 1 by active profit-seeking intermediaries in ac-
cordance with the following chartering restriction: Entrance is permitted by any
competitor who can assume the liabilities of the existing intermediary and offer a
feasible intermediation plan under which shareholder dividends in the entry period
are increased.12 In particular, both the existing intermediary and potential entrants
now are permitted to be active intermediaries who can issue bonds and stock
shares (bubble asset) in the pursuit of higher dividends for shareholders as long as
all contractual obligations are met. If he wishes to retain his monopoly position,
the existing intermediary then must seek a feasible intermediation plan that will
prevent entry, and the question arises whether this preventive behavior is socially
beneficial. As shown below, social welfare is unambiguously increased by this
preventive behavior unless the initially given level b0 for per-capita consumption
loans happens by chance to be set at just the right level.
The first task is to describe more concretely our modeling of an active inter-
mediary. Two basic possibilities can be considered: The active intermediary is a
price-taker who sets quantities, or the active intermediary is a price-setter who
takes quantities as given.
The first possibility is attractive in that the consumers and the firm are already
assumed to be price-takers. Nevertheless, the original motivation for explicitly
introducing the intermediary was to put a corporate business suit on the passive
Walrasian Auctioneer in the Tirole economy, and this auctioneer is most certainly a
price-setter rather than a price-taker. We thus choose to model the active intermedi-
ary as a price-setting agent who posts prices for bonds and stock shares. Moreover,
to restrict attention to the most interesting case in which bonds and stock shares are
both held in equilibrium, we further assume that these posted prices are positive.
Specifically, following the decision by government in period 1 to open up the
intermediation market, the existing now-active intermediary publicly posts a pos-
itive bond price sequence p‚D .p‚1 ; p‚2 ; : : :/, a positive stock share price sequence
pµ D .pµ1 ; pµ2 ; : : :/, and a nonnegative per-share dividend sequence dD .d1; d2; : : :/.
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The collection of sequences ID .p‚; pµ ; d/ is referred to as the intermediary’s
prospectus.
Assuming entry does not occur, consumers and the firm then solve their indi-
vidual optimization problems conditional on the intermediary’s posted prospectus.
Although the price and dividend expectations of the consumers and the firm can
differ in principle from the planned prices and dividends posted by the intermedi-
ary in his prospectus, the definition of an equilibrium for the brokered economy
presented below includes the requirement that the intermediary fulfills all of his
contractual obligations. Without loss of generality, then, we simplify the exposi-
tion by assuming from the start that the price and dividend expectations of the
consumers and the firm coincide with the planned prices and dividends appearing
in the intermediary’s prospectus.
Roughly stated, a prospectus I is feasible if it enables the intermediary to ful-
fill all contractual obligations. An analytical characterization of feasibility for a
prospectus I will now be developed.
First, we assume that the intermediary understands that it is not feasible in
the brokered economy for the per-capita consumer shareholdings, bt D pµt µ st , to
become arbitrarily large over time. This fact, established in Section A.2 of the
Appendix, follows from the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital
and is independent of the intermediary’s behavior.
Second, the intermediary presumably would recognize or discover that bonds
and stock shares must earn a common positive gross rate of return if consumer
optimization is to result in finite demands for bonds and stock shares. Moreover,
given the financing restriction (21), it follows from the regularity conditions im-
posed on the production function in Section 2 that interest rates on bondholding
must be positive. We therefore assume that the intermediary requires his prospec-
tus to satisfy the viability condition (17), where the implied common interest rate
rtC1 in each period t ‚ 1 is strictly positive.
Third, once the intermediary has posted his prospectus I, he must fulfill cer-
tain contractual obligations to young consumers and the firm in each period t ‚ 1.
Specifically, the intermediary must be able to sell bonds and stock shares to period-
t young consumers at the posted bond and stock-share prices p‚t and pµt in order to
realize their savings-level objectives, and he must be able to supply the capital de-
manded by the period-t firm at the implied interest rate rt . Because bonds and stock
shares earn the same interest rate, however, only the overall level of savings matters
to consumers. The specific mix of bonds and stock shares demanded by consumers
thus is determined by the specific mix of bonds and stock shares supplied by the
intermediary. In particular, given the financing restriction (21), the per-capita level
of consumption loans (stock shareholding) is determined by the extent to which
the optimal consumer savings level exceeds the firm’s optimal capital demand.
Consequently, for each t ‚ 0, the intermediary’s period-t per-capita consumption
loans bt D pµt µ st must satisfy13
bt D b.rt ; rtC1/ · s.w.rt /; rtC1/¡ [1C n]k.rtC1/: (32)
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Fourth, the intermediary must fulfill his contractual obligations to old consumers
in each period t ‚ 1. Specifically, he must redeem their bond and stock sharehold-
ings and make per-share dividend payments to them in accordance with the prices
and per-share dividends posted in his prospectus. The intermediary can ensure
redemption of bond and shock shareholdings at his posted prospectus prices by
ensuring that (32) holds for each t ‚ 0. As now shown, however, the intermediary
also needs to abide by a further restriction in order to ensure that he can fulfill his
dividend obligations.
Given the viability condition (17), the financing restriction (21), and relation
(32) for consumption loans, it follows from (22) that the per-capita net receipts of
the intermediary take the form
…t D dtµ
s
t¡1
1C n C b.rt ; rtC1/¡
1C rt
1C n b.rt¡1; rt /; t ‚ 1; (33)
where dt denotes the per-share dividend promised to period-t consumer-shareholders
in the intermediary’s prospectus. Consequently, for the intermediary to be able to
make these dividend payments, it must hold that
…t ‚ dtµ
s
t¡1
1C n ; t ‚ 1; (34)
or equivalently, that
b.rt ; rtC1/¡ 1C rt1C n b.rt¡1; rt / ‚ 0 ; t ‚ 1: (35)
Finally, in total-value terms, note that the intermediary can meet all of his
obligations to agents in each period t ‚ 1, apart from dividend obligations, if
and only if the intermediary’s per-capita net receipts …t are nonnegative in each
period t ‚ 1. Relation (34), together with the assumption that the intermediary
posts positive stock-share prices and nonnegative dividend payments, shows that
this nonnegativity holds if bt¡1D pµt¡1µ st¡1 is nonnegative for each t ‚ 1. The latter
condition is ensured by conditions (32) and (35), however, given the assumed
nonnegativity of b0D b.r0; r1/ and the positivity of r1.
In summary, a collection of sequences ID .p‚; pµ; d/ are said to constitute a
feasible prospectus for the intermediary if it satisfies the following three conditions:
(i) The bond and stock-share prices posted in I are positive and the dividend
payments posted in I are nonnegative; (ii) I satisfies the viability condition (17)
with rtC1> 0 for each t ‚ 1; and (iii) the per-capita consumption loans supplied to
consumers by the intermediary, given by (32), are uniformly bounded above and
satisfy condition (35).
Given a feasible prospectus I, it follows from the general structure of the bro-
kered economy set out in Section 4 that the only aspect of the prospectus that affects
real outcomes in the economy is the associated interest-rate sequence .r1; r2; : : :/.
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Hereafter, this interest-rate sequence is referred to as the intermediation plan
associated with I, denoted by r.I/. Conversely, any interest-rate sequence rD
.r1; r2; : : :/ with rt > 0 for all t ‚ 1 that satisfies condition (iii) in the definition of
a feasible prospectus is said to be a feasible intermediation plan for the interme-
diary, because any such interest-rate sequence constitutes an intermediation plan
r.I/ for at least one feasible prospectus I.14
Conditions have now been set out that define what it means for the existing
intermediary to view an interest-rate sequence as a feasible intermediation plan.
Still to be specified, however, is the objective of the intermediary that determines
how he will choose a particular intermediation plan from this feasible set in order
to protect himself against potential entrants able to attract away his prospective
shareholders.
It is shown first that, relative to an existing intermediary with a feasible inter-
mediation plan r, a potential entrant in period t that assumes the liabilities of the
existing intermediary can feasibly increase the dividends paid out in period t if
and only if he can feasibly offer a higher interest rate rtC1.
To see this, suppose that a potential entrant offers an intermediation plan r0 in
some period t ‚ 1 as a feasible alternative to an existing intermediation plan r. As
explained above, feasibility of an intermediation plan requires the period-1 interest
rate r1 to satisfy relation (32) for t D 0. As discussed in Section 4, this requirement
determines a unique positive value for r1, so potential entrants have no feasible
way to change r1.
Suppose, then, that r 0s D rs for all s • t and r 0tC1> rtC1. Given that the potential
entrant assumes the liabilities of the existing intermediary, his net receipts in period
t are determined by (33) with r 0tC1 in place of rtC1. It follows that the increase in
rtC1 will increase period-t net receipts relative to the net receipts of the existing
intermediary—and thus provide for the possibility of a windfall per-share dividend
payment to period-t shareholders in excess of their currently expected per-share
dividend payment dt —if and only if the consumption loan level b .rt ; rtC1/ of each
period-t young consumer increases with increases in rtC1, that is, if and only if
@s.w.rt /; rtC1/
@rtC1
> [1C n]k 0.rtC1/: (36)
Condition (36) is equivalent to a condition imposed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) on
the slope of the savings supply curve relative to the capital demand curve. As
noted in Section 2 and detailed in Section A.1 of the Appendix, condition (36)
is one of the regularity conditions assumed to hold throughout the present paper.
Consequently, the increase in rtC1 will increase feasible dividend payments in the
entry period.
Conversely, suppose r 0s D rs for all s • t and r 0tC1< rtC1. Given (36), it is imme-
diately seen that dividend payments in the entry period then must decrease.
It follows as a corollary to these arguments that a potential entrant in period t who
assumes the liabilities of the existing intermediary can always offer an alternative
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intermediation plan r0 that is feasible through period t and that increases period-t
dividends: Simply let r0 coincide with the existing intermediation plan r through
period t and satisfy r 0tC1> rtC1. The possibility of successful entry against the
existing intermediary in period t thus hinges upon whether or not there exists
an intermediation plan of this form that is also feasible for all periods s> t . If
so, the existing intermediation plan r will be said to be susceptible to entry in
period t.
An intermediation plan r will be said to be optimal if (a) it is feasible, and
(b) it is not susceptible to entry in any period t . In principle, the set of optimal
intermediation plans can be determined through the use of conditions (32) and (35)
once values are given for the exogenous parameters k0 and b0. Letting R .k0; b0/
denote this set of optimal intermediation plans, it is assumed that the existing
intermediary in period 1 selects a new intermediation plan from the set of optimal
plans in R .k0; b0/ after the government in period 1 opens the intermediation market
to potential entrants.
A definition of an equilibrium is now given for the brokered economy in per-
capita form that includes the no-entry objective of the intermediary as well as the
objectives of the consumers and the firm.
DEFINITION 2 (Brokered-Economy Equilibrium). Let initial values .k0; ‚0/>
0 and .b0; µ0/‚ 0 for per-capita capital, bonds, consumption loans, and stock
shares be given, where µ0D 0 if and only if b0D 0. Then a sequence .vt; kdt ;mt;
wt : t ‚ 1/ consisting of consumer-choice vectors vtD .st ; c1t ; c2t , ‚dt ; µdt /, firm per-
capita capital demands kdt > 0, intermediary choice vectors mtD .rt ; p‚t , pµt ; dt ; kst ;
‚st ; bt ; µ st /, and wage rateswt > 0 is a brokered-economy equilibrium e.k0; ‚0; b0;
µ0/ if the following five conditions are met:
(i) Firm optimization. In each period t ‚ 0, rt D f 0.kdt / and wt D f .kdt / ¡ f 0.kdt /kdt ,
where kd0 · k0.
(ii) Consumer optimization. In each period t ‚ 1, the young consumer’s choice vector
xtD .st , c1t , c2tC1) solves the lifetime utility maximization problem (1), conditional
on wt and rtC1, i.e., xtD x.wt ; rtC1/D .s.wt ; rtC1/; c1.wt ; rtC1/; c2.wt ; rtC1//; and
each old consumer in period 1 consumes c21 D [1C r1]s.w0; r1/.
(iii) Financing restriction. In each period t ‚ 1, capital loans .1 C n/kst are financed
solely by means of bond transactions p‚t¡1‚st¡1 and consumption loans bt¡1 are
financed solely by means of stock-share transactions pµt¡1µ st¡1, where ‚s0 · ‚0, µ s0 ·
µ0, and p‚0 and pµ0 are any positive values satisfying .1 C n/ks1D p‚0‚0 and b0D
pµ0µ0.
(iv) Intermediary optimization. For each t ‚ 0, the consumption loan level bt D p‚t ‚st
equals [s.w.rt /; rtC1/¡ .1C n/k.rtC1/] and the total portfolio value p‚t ‚st C pµt µ st
supplied to each young consumer equals s.w.rt /; rtC1/, wherew.r/ and k.r/ are the
factor-price frontier functions derived from r D f 0.k/ andwD f .k/¡ f 0.k/k. More-
over, the interest-rate sequence rD .r1; r2; : : :/ is an element of the set R.k0; b0/ of
optimal intermediation plans, and the collection of sequences ID .p‚; pµ; d/ consti-
tutes a feasible prospectus that supports this optimal intermediation plan.
(v) Market-clearing conditions. In each period t ‚ 1, the bond, stock-share, and capital
market-clearing conditions (28) through (30) hold, and the product market clears
in the sense that excess supply is nonnegative.15
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A brokered-economy equilibrium e.k0; ‚0; b0; µ0/will be called stationary if kt D
k0, ‚t D ‚0, bt D b0, and µt D µ0 for all t ‚ 1.
An immediate and important implication of this equilibrium definition with
active intermediation is that the Pareto-inefficient stationary equilibrium e¯ for
the Tirole economy cannot be supported as an equilibrium real outcome for the
brokered economy because it is susceptible to entry. More generally, as shown in
Theorem 1, below, the optimizing behavior of the active intermediary rules out
any path for the brokered economy that converges to e¯ in real terms because all
such equilibria are susceptible to entry.
One key observation used in the proof of Theorem 1 is that the active inter-
mediary in the brokered economy, able to issue new stock shares, functions as a
selection mechanism for picking out which Tirole equilibrium path the brokered
economy will follow in real terms.
To see this, note that the two basic state equations (12) and (13) characterizing
a Tirole economy equilibrium also are satisfied by any brokered-economy equi-
librium once the intermediary stops issuing new stock shares, in which case all
actual dividend payments are zero. More generally, these two state equations hold
whenever the per-share dividends promised in the intermediary’s prospectus ab-
sorb all of his net receipts, whether or not these net receipts are zero and whether
or not new stock shares are issued. These claims follow from a consideration of
form (33) for the intermediary’s per-capita net receipts.
Another key observation used in the proof of Theorem 1 is that the possibility
of successful entry by a competing intermediary through additional stock-share
issue permits the brokered economy to traverse from one Tirole equilibrium path
to another if the existing brokered-economy intermediary is not currently pursuing
an optimal intermediation plan.
THEOREM 1. Given any value k> 0 for per-capita capital, let b.k/‚ 0 denote
the maximum feasible value for per-capita consumption loans as determined for
the Tirole economy by Tirole (1985, Prop. 1, p. 1504).16 Then the following holds.
Given .k0; b0/ such that 0• b0• b.k0/, there exists a unique optimal intermedia-
tion plan for the brokered economy. Moreover, the interest rates rt that constitute
this optimal intermediation plan satisfy rt ! n as t !1.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 follows directly from simple modifications in
the proof of Proposition 1 by Tirole (1985, p. 1504).
Suppose, first, that b0 satisfies 0• b0< b.k0/. This initially places the brokered
economy at a point .k0; b0/ in the .k; b/ plane that is strictly below the locus of
points .k; b/ with bD b.k/, hereafter referred to as the Tirole saddle path. One
such point is illustrated in Figure 2.
Given k0 and b0, feasibility requires the existing intermediary, as well as any
potential entrant in period 1, to set the period-1 interest rate in accordance with
relation (32) for t D 0. As discussed in Section 4, the latter relation determines a
unique positive value rˆ1 for r1 as a function of k0 and b0, which in turn determines
a unique positive value ˆk1 for the period-1 level k1 of per-capita capital through
the firm profit maximization condition rˆ1D f 0.ˆk1/.
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However, as detailed earlier in this section, a potential entrant in period 1 could
deliver a greater dividend to shareholders in period 1 than the existing intermediary
by increasing the period-2 interest rate r2. Condition (36) ensures that this increase
in r2 moves the economy vertically upward from the point .ˆk1; b1/ where the
economy would otherwise have been in period 1 if the economy had simply pursued
the Tirole equilibrium resulting under passive intermediation, starting from the
initial conditions .k0; b0/.
If the increase in r2 results in an increase in the consumption loan level b1 that is
less than b.ˆk1/—implying that the economy is below the Tirole saddle path—this
places the economy on another feasible Tirole equilibrium path; but further entry
in period 1 is still feasible. If the increase in r2 results in an increase in b1 to the
value b.ˆk1/, this places the economy on a feasible Tirole equilibrium path—the
Tirole saddle path—for which further entry is not feasible. The reason for this is
that, once on the saddle path, any attempt to offer a higher interest rate in some
period t than is currently being offered would move the economy above the Tirole
saddle path and hence onto an infeasible path where the consumption loan levels
eventually explode. Finally, if the increase in r2 results in an increase in b1 to a
value that lies above b.ˆk1/, implying the economy is above the Tirole saddle path,
the economy immediately moves onto an infeasible path where the consumption
loan levels eventually explode, implying that the entrant’s proposed intermediation
plan is not feasible. These arguments directly follow from Proposition 1 in Tirole
(1985, p. 1504) and can be understood intuitively by referring to Figure 2.
It follows from these arguments that, to protect against entry in period 1, the
optimizing intermediary should set the period-2 interest rate so that the period-1
consumption loan level equals b.ˆk1/. Note by condition (36) that b.rˆ1; r2/ is a
strictly increasing function of r2; hence the particular interest rate rˆ2 that achieves
b.ˆk1/ is a uniquely determined value. Moreover, rˆ2 must be positive, because, by
construction, all interest rates that support Tirole equilibria must be positive.
Similar arguments apply for protection against entry in all subsequent periods
t ‚ 2. Consequently, to protect against entry in all periods t ‚ 1, the optimizing
intermediary must set the period-1 interest rate to the unique value rˆ1> 0 that
satisfies relation (32) for t D 0 for the given initial values k0 and b0 and then set the
uniquely determined interest rates rˆt > 0 for subsequent periods t ‚ 2 that ensure
that the brokered economy attains the Tirole saddle path, i.e., that ensure a con-
sumption loan level equal to b.ˆkt / for all t ‚ 1. By construction, the consumption
loan levels b.ˆkt / for t ‚ 1 then lie along a Tirole equilibrium path—namely, the
Tirole saddle path—and hence satisfy the Tirole state equation (13) for all t ‚ 2.
Consequently, relation (35) holds for all t ‚ 2. Moreover, b1 and b0 lie along a
(different) Tirole equilibrium path and hence satisfy (13) for t D 1 with r1D rˆ1D
f 0.ˆk1/. Because b.ˆk1/‚ b1 by construction, it follows that condition (35) holds
for t D 1. The uniquely determined positive interest-rate sequence .rˆ1; rˆ2; rˆ3; : : :/
thus constitutes a unique optimal intermediation plan in the sense defined earlier
in this section.
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Finally, as established by Tirole (1985, Prop. 1, p. 1505) and indicated in Fig-
ure 2, along the Tirole saddle path the level ˆkt for per-capita capital converges to
kn D k.n/ as t !1, implying that the interest rate rˆt converges to the golden-rule
interest rate n as t !1.
If b0D b.k0/, it is clear from the above arguments that the optimizing intermedi-
ary would again set rt D rˆt in all periods t ‚ 2 to ensure that the brokered economy
moves along the Tirole saddle path in periods t ‚ 1. The only change from the
preceding case is that the value for the period-1 interest rate r1 now supports the
per-capita consumption loan level b.k0/ on the Tirole saddle path, implying that
the brokered-economy equilibrium path coincides with the Tirole saddle path for
all t ‚ 0.
The corollary, below, demonstrates that the no-entry objective of the active
brokered-economy intermediary is consistent with the goal of market-value max-
imization, where market value is measured by the value of the intermediary’s
outstanding stock shares. The proof of this corollary follows immediately from
the proof of Theorem 1.
COROLLARY 1. Given any brokered-economy equilibrium, the market value
Bt D pµt 2st of the active intermediary in each period t ‚ 1 is positive and takes on
its maximum feasible value Lt b.kt /.
For use in the next theorem, define
qt · [1C rt ][1C n] ; t ‚ 1; (37)
and
Qt · [qt qt¡1 : : : q1]b0; t ‚ 1: (38)
Also, for each t and k satisfying t ‚ k ‚ 1, define
st;k · [qt qt¡1 : : : qkC1qk] (39)
and
St ·
tX
kD1
st;k : (40)
THEOREM 2. If r is a feasible intermediation plan for the brokered economy
that is not susceptible to entry, then
lim
t!C1 St D C1; (41)
and the sequence .Qt / is uniformly bounded above. Conversely, if r is a feasible
intermediation plan that is susceptible to entry under which stock shares are in
fixed supply, then the sequence .St / must converge and the sequence .Qt / must
converge to 0.
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Proof. As established in the proof for Theorem 1, the unique intermediation
plan for the brokered economy that is not susceptible to entry is the plan rˆ that
follows the Tirole saddle path for t ‚ 1 with rt converging to n. Given rt ! n as
t!1, however, the tail sum St ¡ St 0 can be made arbitrarily large by making t
sufficiently larger than t 0 for some sufficiently large t 0, because in this way, the
terms st;k appearing in this tail sum can be made arbitrarily close to 1. Because St 0
is positive for all t 0, it follows that (41) must hold.
Also, if r is an optimal (hence feasible) intermediation plan for the brokered
economy, it follows by the definition of feasibility that the associated sequence .bt /
of per-capita consumption loan levels must be uniformly bounded above and must
satisfy bt ‚ Qt for each t ‚ 1. The sequence .Qt / therefore must be uniformly
bounded above.
Conversely, suppose that r is an intermediation plan susceptible to entry un-
der which stock shares are in fixed supply. Any feasible intermediation path for
the brokered economy that involves a fixed stock-share supply must satisfy the
two state equations (12) and (13) characterizing Tirole equilibria and hence must
move the brokered economy in real terms along a Tirole equilibrium path. If r
is susceptible to entry, however, it follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that this
Tirole equilibrium path cannot be the Tirole saddle path. As established by Tirole
(1985, Prop. 1, p. 1504), all Tirole equilibrium paths apart from the Tirole saddle
path are characterized by interest rates that converge to r¯ as t !1, where r¯ < n
(cf. Figure 2). Consequently, any such brokered-economy equilibrium must be
characterized by interest rates rt that ultimately converge to r¯ , which implies that
qt defined as in (37) converges to q¯ D [1 C r¯ ]=[1 C n]< 1. By construction, the
terms St defined in (40) are positive terms that satisfy St D qt¡1[1C St¡1]. Given
qt! q¯ < 1, it follows by backward recursion that .St / is uniformly bounded, hence
St must converge to q¯=[1¡ q¯].
Finally, if rt ! r¯ as t !1, then Qt ! 0 as t !1.
The price condition (41) appearing in Theorem 2 is the brokered-economy
analog of the well-known Cass–Balasko–Shell transversality condition shown by
Balasko and Shell (1980, Prop. 5.6, pp. 296–297) to be necessary for Pareto effi-
ciency in a pure-exchange overlapping generations context.17 Balasko and Shell
do not provide an economic motivation for their transversality condition. Theo-
rem 2 demonstrates that, for the brokered economy, condition (41) constitutes a
necessary condition for the intermediary’s selected intermediation plan to be op-
timal. Moreover, in the absence of new stock-share issue, it is also sufficient for
optimality.
Interestingly, given a brokered economy with b0< b.k0/, it is feasible (but not
optimal) for an active intermediary to continually traverse across Tirole-economy
equilibria with successive new stock-share issues so that bt < b.kt / for each t ‚ 0
but rt ! n as t ! 1. Consequently, condition (41) holds despite the fact that
the intermediation plan is susceptible to entry in each period t ‚ 1. This is why
the qualifier concerning stock-share issue is needed in the sufficiency direction for
Theorem 2.
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THEOREM 3. There exists at least one stationary equilibrium for the bro-
kered economy. Every stationary equilibrium generates the same real outcome
(s; c1; c2; k; b; r; w), where s · [c1¡w]; namely, the Pareto-efficient real outcome
en D e.kn; bn/ constituting the golden-rule equilibrium for the Tirole economy. In
particular, the unique stationary equilibrium interest rate r for the brokered econ-
omy is given by r D n.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that the unique optimal stationary intermediation
plan r for the brokered economy is given by rt D n for all t ‚ 1. Consequently, the
corresponding stationary equilibrium values for per-capita capital and per-capita
consumption loans are given by the Tirole golden-rule solution values .kn; bn/,
where f 0.kn/D n and bn D b.kn/ (see Section 2). The remaining assertions of
Theorem 3 are then easily verified.
Theorem 3 demonstrates that the Pareto-efficient golden-rule equilibrium for
the Tirole economy is the unique real outcome possible for the brokered economy
in any stationary equilibrium. In particular, the Pareto-inefficient stationary equi-
librium e¯ for the Tirole economy is not supported as a stationary-equilibrium real
outcome for the brokered economy. As noted in Section 2.2, all Pareto-inefficient
equilibria for the Tirole economy converge to e¯; hence one might surmise that the
elimination of this Pareto-inefficient outcome would lead to the restoration of a
first welfare theorem. The next theorem establishes that this is indeed the case.
THEOREM 4. All brokered-economy equilibria are Pareto efficient.
Proof. As established by Tirole (1985, Prop. 1, p. 1504), the set of equilibria for
the Tirole economy can be partitioned into two subsets: the Pareto-efficient equi-
libria characterized by interest rates that converge to n; and the Pareto-inefficient
equilibria characterized by interest rates that converge to r¯ < n. As shown in the
proof of Theorem 1, above, the unique optimal intermediation plan for the brokered
economy is characterized by interest rates converging to n, and the equilibrium
paths for kt and bt that are supported by this intermediation plan coincide for
all t ‚ 1 with the Pareto-efficient Tirole-economy equilibrium given by the Tirole
saddle path. Moreover, given k0 and b0, there is no way to achieve a Pareto im-
provement of these kt and bt paths without violating the feasibility condition (32)
at t D 0.
To summarize, the key result of this section is that the inefficiency observed in
the Tirole economy is eliminated completely when intermediation is modeled as a
contestable activity carried out by a corporate intermediary owned by consumer-
shareholders and operated in their interest. Assuming b0< b.k0/, this elimination
requires the active intermediary to issue new stock shares in period 1, which results
in an increase in his net receipts in excess of his current contractual obligations.
The intermediary’s excess net receipts constitute a windfall dividend payment for
his current shareholders, the initial generation-0 old consumers.
These findings caution that the inefficiency observed in standard modelings of
overlapping generations economies with production and unsecured debt may not
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be the reflection of an intrinsic market failure. Rather, the observed inefficiency
could instead be due to a fundamental incompleteness in the model specification—
the presumed inability of private agents to exploit the earnings opportunities as-
sociated with incurring and forever rolling over debt.
NOTES
1. In Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991a), it is shown that passive intermediation is the root cause of the
Pareto inefficiency problems for Samuelson’s (1958) pure exchange economy, a special case of the
Tirole economy.
2. Bernanke and Gertler (1987) also introduce intermediaries (banks or insider investment coali-
tions) into an overlapping generations model. However, they focus on the potential role of these
intermediaries in reducing deadweight losses due to principal-agent problems in the loan market for
investment projects. They do not permit intermediaries to issue consumption loans. The closest fore-
runner to the present paper appears to be Thompson (1967). Thompson argues that genuinely perfect
competition requires the introduction of a market for private debt instruments (e.g., a corporate pension
fund), a market omitted from models such as Samuelson (1958).
3. An asset is said to exhibit a bubble at time t if its price at time t differs from its fundamental
value, determined as the present value of its current and future dividends. A bubble asset is any asset on
which a bubble may form. When an asset pays no dividends, it necessarily exhibits a bubble whenever
its price is positive. Tirole (1985) does not incorporate a market for stock shares into his model; hence
bubbles on capital holdings are not considered.
4. Specifically, it is assumed that U .¢/ is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and
strictly quasi concave, with U .0; c2tC1/DU .c1t ; 0/DU .0; 0/.
5. More precisely, the following restrictions are imposed on F.¢/: twice-continuous differentiability
and strict concavity over the positive orthant R2CC with FK > 0, FL > 0, and FK K < 0; continuity over
the nonnegative orthant R2C with F.0; 0/D F.0; L/D F.K ; 0/D 0; and, for each L > 0, FK .K ; L/!
0 as K !C1 and FK .K ; L/!C1 as K ! 0.
6. In the standard Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium model with nonsatiated consumers, market-
clearing conditions typically only require that supply be at least as great as demand in quantity terms.
Walras’ law then implies that any good in excess supply must have a zero price. However, as detailed
by Pingle and Tesfatsion (1994), Walras’ law need not hold in overlapping generations models without
unsecured debt. Consequently, market-clearing conditions traditionally have been stated in a stronger
form requiring directly that supply equal demand in each market in real-value terms. See, for example,
Diamond (1965), Gale (1973), Balasko and Shell (1980), Tirole (1985), and Azariadis (1993, Ch. 13).
7. Given consumer and firm optimization and the capital market-clearing condition (6), the bubble
asset growth restriction (8) is equivalent to the product market-clearing condition (9). To see this,
consider the following sequence of implications in both forward and reverse directions:
.1C n/ktC1 C c1t C c2t =[1C n] D yt C kt I
.1C n/ktC1 C [wt ¡ st ]C [1C rt ]st¡1=[1C n] D yt C kt I
.1C n/ktC1 C [wt ¡ st ]C [1C rt ]st¡1=[1C n] D wt C [1C rt ]kt I
.1C n/ktC1 ¡ st C [1C rt ]st¡1=[1C n] D [1C rt ]kt I
.1C n/ktC1 ¡ [bt C [1C n]ktC1]C [1C rt ][bt¡1 C [1C n]kt ]=[1C n] D [1C rt ]kt I
¡bt C [1C rt ]bt¡1=[1C n] D 0
8. Because the proof is not entirely straightforward, it is given in Section A.1 of the Appendix.
9. Recalling the definitions for the factor-price frontier functions w.r/ and k.r/ given in Sec-
tion 2.1, it is assumed here as for the Tirole economy that there exists a unique r¯ satisfying s.w.r¯/; r¯/D
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[1Cn]k.r¯/, with r¯ < n. Also, as noted in Section 2.2, Tirole (1985) imposes several additional technical
regularity conditions on the savings function s.¢/ and the production function f .¢/. These regularity
conditions also are assumed to hold for the brokered economy. A detailed statement of these regularity
conditions can be found in Section A.1 of the Appendix.
10. As noted in Section 3, excess supply in the product market could feasibly occur in the Tirole
economy because the intermediary could accumulate positive net receipts (positive amounts of good)
that he does not distribute back to consumers. Consequently, the supply-equal-demand equilibrium
condition for the Tirole product market is overly restrictive. In the brokered economy with passive
intermediation, however, it is assumed that all of the intermediary’s net receipts are distributed back to
consumers in the period in which they are accumulated. Thus, all goods produced in any period t are
acquired by consumers through wages, dividends, and net receipts from bond and stock transactions.
The supply-equal-demand condition (31) is therefore an appropriate product market-clearing condition
for the brokered economy with passive intermediation.
11. Specifically, any equilibrium (st , c1t , c2t , kt , bt , rt , wt : t ‚ 1) for a Tirole economy with initial
conditions of the form k0 > 0 and b0 ‚ 0 is an equilibrium sequence of real outcomes for a Walrasian
brokered economy with initial conditions of the form (k0, ‚0)> 0 and (b0, µ0)‚ 0, and vice versa,
where st · [c1t ¡ wt ] for the brokered economy.
12. Empirical findings suggest that chartering and other government-imposed restrictions currently
in force do restrict entry into U.S. financial markets [Amel and Liang (1992)]. Indeed, as noted by
Kaufman (1992, p. 296), among the requirements typically included for obtaining a commercial bank
charter in the U.S. is a demonstration that the services proposed by the applicant are needed and will
not endanger the solvency of other similar financial institutions. Our assumption that any entering
intermediary must assume the liabilities of the existing intermediary can be interpreted as a buy-out
condition that prevents the insolvency of the existing intermediary.
13. In reality, the intermediary would have to discover the form of the function b.rt ; rtC1/ in the
process of implementing his prospectus. For this initial study, however, we make the simplifying
assumption that the intermediary knows this function.
14. To see this, first note that no intermediary in period 1 has any leeway in the setting of r1, or
any nontrivial leeway in the setting of the associated initial prices p‚0 and p
µ
0 if existing contractual
obligations are to be fulfilled. Specifically, it follows from condition (iii) in the definition of a feasible
prospectus that r1 > 0 is uniquely determined as a function of the exogenously given values k0 and
b0 by relation (32) for t D 0, which then determines p‚0 and pµ0 as well (see Section 4). To construct
a feasible prospectus that supports the interest-rate sequence r, it then suffices to let the dividend
payment dt be zero for each t ‚ 1 and to set the bond and stock-share prices p‚t and pµt for t ‚ 1 to
positive values that satisfy the viability condition (17) in each period t ‚ 1 for the given interest-rate
sequence.
15. These market-clearing conditions are actually implied by previous conditions of the definition
and are stated only for clarity. As the intermediary acts to mediate savings into investment, he also acts
to ensure the market-clearing conditions for bonds, stock shares, and capital. Moreover, nonnegative
excess supply in the product market is ensured by condition (35) (cf. note 7). Positive excess product
supply can occur only if the intermediary is able to generate net receipts in excess of his dividend
obligations without permitting successful entry by a competitor.
16. See Section 2.
17. In further analogy to Theorem 2, Balasko and Shell (1980) also show the sufficiency of this
transversality condition for Pareto efficiency if certain additional restrictions hold.
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APPENDIX
A.1. PROOF THAT bn > 0
Tirole [1985, eq. (8), p. 1502] assumes that the equation 0 D z.r/ has a unique solution r¯ ,
where
z.r/ · [Lt¡1s.w.r/; r/¡ Lt k.r/]=Lt D s.w.r/; r/=[1C n]¡ k.r/ (A.1)
denotes the excess supply of savings per young consumer when each optimizing consumer
and producer is faced with the interest rate r . In addition, much of Tirole’s analysis focuses
on the case in which inefficiency is possible, which requires r¯ < n. As noted in Section 2.2,
these regularity conditions also are assumed to hold in the present paper.
It is first shown that, under these assumptions, the excess supply of savings z.r/ is an
increasing function of r at r D r¯ ; i.e., 0< z0.r¯/. Using this result, it then is shown that
0< z.r/ for all r satisfying r¯ < r: (A.2)
Hence, in particular, 0< z.n/ D bn=[1C n].
Given the stationary interest rate r¯ , producer optimization in the Tirole economy implies
that the capital/labor ratio k and the wage rate w satisfy r¯ D f 0.k/ and wD f .k/¡ f 0.k/k.
Consequently, it follows from Section 2.2 that kD k.r¯/ and wDw.r¯/ with
k 0.r¯/ D 1= f 00.k.r¯//I (A.3)
w0.r¯/ D ¡k.r¯/ ¢ f 00.k.r¯// ¢ k 0.r¯/ D ¡k.r¯/: (A.4)
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Using conditions (44) and (45), one obtains
z0.r¯/ D [sw.w.r¯/; r¯/w0.r¯/C sr .w.r¯/; r¯/]=[1C n]¡ k 0.r¯/
D [sr .w.r¯/; r¯/¡ sw.w.r¯/; r¯/k.r¯/ f 00.k.r¯//k 0.r¯/]=[1C n]¡ k 0.r¯/
D [sr .w.r¯/; r¯/¡ sw.w.r¯/; r¯/k.r¯/]=[1C n]¡ k 0.r¯/: (A.5)
Diamond [1965, eq. (11), p. 1133] places a condition on the relative slopes of the capital
market supply and demand curves along any competitive equilibrium path. In particular,
for the unique stationary competitive equilibrium e¯ = e.k.r¯/; 0/ associated with r¯ , this
condition reduces to
[ f 00.k.r¯//sw.w.r¯/; r¯/]=[1C n ¡ f 00.k.r¯//sr .w.r¯/; r¯/]< 0: (A.6)
Moreover, to guarantee that consumption is a normal good in each period of life for each
agent, Diamond (1965, pp. 1131–1132 n. 6) assumes that 0< sw < 1. The numerator in
condition (A.6) is therefore negative. Thus, for condition (A.6) to hold, the denominator
must be positive, i.e.,
[1C n ¡ f 00.k.r¯//sr .w.r¯/; r¯/] > 0: (A.7)
Diamond [1965, eq. (12), p. 1134] also assumes that e¯ is locally stable, and he gives a
condition that is necessary for this to be the case, namely,
j[¡k.r¯/ f 00.k.r¯//sw.w.r¯/; r¯/]=[1C n ¡ f 00.k.r¯//sr .w.r¯/; r¯/]j • 1: (A.8)
These same conditions are imposed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) and are assumed to hold in
the present paper as well.
A sufficient condition for the local stability of e¯ is that condition (A.8) holds with strict
inequality. This slightly stronger condition is assumed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) and also is
assumed to hold in the present paper. Using conditions (A.3), (A.5), (A.7), and (A.8) with
strict inequality, one then obtains the following series of implications:
[¡k.r¯/ f 00.k.r¯//sw.w.r¯/; r¯/] < [1C n ¡ f 00.k.r¯//sr .w.r¯/; r¯/]I
0 < [k.r¯/ f 00.k.r¯//sw.w.r¯/; r¯/C 1C n ¡ f 00.k.r¯//sr .w.r¯/; r¯/]I
0 < [¡k 0.r¯/k.r¯/ f 00.k.r¯//sw.r¯ ; w.r¯//¡ k 0.r¯/[1C n]C k 0.r¯/ f 00.k.r¯//sr .w.r¯/; r¯/]I
(A.9)
0 < [¡k.r¯/sw.w.r¯/; r¯/¡ k 0.r¯/[1C n]C sr .w.r¯/; r¯/]I
0 < [sr .w.r¯/; r¯/¡ sw.w.r¯/; r¯/k.r¯/]=[1C n]¡ k 0.r¯/I
0 < z0.r¯/:
As previously noted, r¯ satisfies 0D z.r¯/. It follows from (A.9) that, for some positive †,
0< z.r/ for all r in the interval (r¯ ; r¯ C †). Suppose that z.r⁄/• 0 for some r⁄ satisfying
r¯ C † < r⁄. By continuity of z.¢/, this would imply the existence of some ro lying between
r¯ C † and r⁄ that satisfies 0D z.ro/, a contradiction of the assumption that there exists a
unique solution to the equation 0 D z.r/.
It follows that condition (A.2) must hold for the Tirole economy. ¥
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A.2. PROOF THAT bt CANNOT DIVERGE IN ANY
BROKERED-ECONOMY EQUILIBRIUM
Along any equilibrium path for the brokered economy, the per-capita consumption loan
levels bt supplied by the intermediary are given by relation (32), implying that bt D [st ¡
.1Cn/ktC1] for each t ‚ 0. In addition, they must satisfy condition (35) in order to guarantee
that dividend obligations can be met. Suppose the sequence .bt / diverges to infinity. Because
the historically given value b0 is nonnegative by assumption, and all equilibrium interest
rates are positive, it follows from (35) that the sequence .bt / is nonnegative. Consequently,
bt must become infinitely large as t approaches infinity.
The equilibrium savings st of each generation-t young consumer must be nonnegative
and less than his endowmentwt for the consumer to consume a nonnegative amount of good
when young and when old. Because all equilibrium interest rates are positive, the producer
optimization condition (4) implies that the equilibrium capital/labor ratios kt also must be
positive. Consequently, it follows from (32) that bt can only become infinitely large if st
and thus wt both become infinitely large.
Using these observations, together with the producer optimization condition (5), it must
hold for each t ‚ 1 that
0 • bt=kt • st=kt • wt=kt D f .kt /=kt ¡ f 0.kt / < f .kt /=kt : (A.10)
By conditions (4) and (5), and the production-function restrictions given in note 5, for
wt to become infinitely large as t approaches infinity, the interest rate rt must approach
zero and the capital/labor ratio kt must become infinitely large as t approaches infinity.
Consequently, by strict concavity of the production function f .¢/, and the assumption that
f 0.k/ approaches zero as k approaches infinity, the average product of capital f .kt /=kt must
approach zero as t approaches infinity, implying from relation (A.10) that the ratio st=kt
also approaches zero as t approaches infinity.
Finally, it follows from (32) and previous observations that
st¡1=kt¡1 ¡ [1C n]kt=kt¡1 D bt¡1=kt¡1 ‚ 0 (A.11)
for each t ‚ 1. Because st¡1=kt¡1 approaches zero as t approaches infinity, the (positive)
term [1Cn]kt=kt¡1 also must approach zero as t approaches infinity in order to have the right
term remain nonnegative for all t . Consequently, kt < kt¡1 for all sufficiently large t , but
this contradicts the fact, established above, that kt becomes infinitely large as t approaches
infinity.
It follows that no equilibrium consumption loan sequence .bt / for the brokered economy
can diverge to infinity. ¥
